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IF AT FIRST YOU DON'T SUCCEED: THE REAL AND POTENTIAL
IMPACT OF SIMMONS V. SOUTH CAROLINA IN VIRGINIA
BY: BARBRA ANNA POHL AND CAMERON P. TURNER1
I. INTRODUCTION
For several years prior to the holding of the United States Supreme
Court in Simmons v. South Carolina,2 the Virginia Capital Case Clear-
inghouse had urged defense attorneys to raise the issue of the capital
jury's right to be provided with accurate parole information. The
Clearinghouse provided assistance in preserving and briefing the issue
on grounds ultimately presented to the Supreme Court in Simmons. Time
and again, the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected this claim.3 The
Virginia court based its decision upon "a fear that juries will not impose
a just punishment for the defendant's crimes, but will try to adjust a
sentence based on speculation over parole."4 Another justification was
grounded in "a separation of powers argument concerning the proper
functioning of the executive and judicial branches."5 The Supreme
Court of South Carolina followed this same reasoning and, in addition,
stated that the disbursement of accurate parole eligibility information to
the jury offered practical problems in application.
6
One of these grounds is plainly inapplicable to capital cases. The
concern that ajury will take it upon itself to estimate when the defendant
will be eligible for parole and adjust its sentence accordingly is not a
problem in a capital case because the jury does not have to decide
between prison terms of varying durations. Its choices are limited to a
sentence of life imprisonment or death.
Some attorneys who did not succeed in the Supreme Court of
Virginia pressed on and preserved the Simmons issue. Many who knew
it would be rejected in the Supreme Court of Virginia nevertheless raised
and preserved it before and during trial. The clients of these attorneys are
the actual and potential beneficiaries of the decision in Simmons. Unfor-
I Sections IH-VI by Pohl, VII-X by Turner.
2 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
3 See, e.g., Mickens v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 395, 404-05, 442
S.E.2d 678,685 (1994), and case summary of Mickens, Capital Defense
Digest, this issue; Wright v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 177, 197, 427
S.E.2d379,392(1993);Muellerv. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 386,408-09,
422 S.E.2d 380,394-95 (1992),cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1880 (1993);King
v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 353, 367-68, 416 S.E.2d 669, 677, cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 417 (1992); Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 121,
127, 410 S.E.2d 254, 258 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1500 (1992);
Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364,371,402 S.E.2d 218,223,
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 113 (1991); Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va.
236,248-49,397 S.E.2d 385,392-93 (1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 88
(1991); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78,85,393 S.E.2d 609,613,
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990); Watkins v. Commonwealth, 238 Va.
341,351,385 S.E.2d 50,56 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1074 (1990);
Turnerv. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 543,551-52,364 S.E.2d483,487-88,
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988); O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va.
672, 701, 364 S.E.2d 491, 507, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 871 (1988);
Williams v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 168, 178-80,360 S.E.2d 361,367-
68 (1987), cert. denied,484 U.S. 1020 (1988);Poynerv. Commonwealth,
229 Va. 401, 432, 329 S.E.2d 815, 836-37, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865
(1985); Clanton v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 41,54-55,286 S.E.2d 172,
tunately, there are other cases where the issue should have appeared but
did not. Simmons reinforces the message sent years ago in the case of
Michael Mamell Smith. 7 Smith was executed in spite of a meritorious
claim of error. The psychiatrist who examined him did not inform him
that the statements he made could be used against him, that he had the
right to remain silent or that he could have had counsel present. This
mistake was a violation of Smith's constitutional rights under Estelle v.
Smith.8 His attorney adhered to an appellate practice strategy that is quite
reasonable in a non-capital case. He omitted the claim because it had
been previously rejected by the Supreme Court of Virginia.
Like Smith, Simmons is a reminder that all non-frivolous claims
must be raised and preserved in capital cases regardless of the position
of the Supreme Court of Virginia. An attorney who wants to conduct
proper appellate litigation should not do so by picking only those issues
on which the Supreme Court of Virginia has granted relief in the past.9
This article will examine (a) the retroactivity of Simmons, (b) the
direct application of Simmons in Virginia, and (c) the applicability of the
Simmons rationale to "parole eligible" capital defendants. Arguments on
behalf of the first class of defendants may well not succeed in the
Supreme Court of Virginia. The history of Simmons claims themselves,
however, is a reminder that the fight must not stop there.
II. WHEN "LIFE" MEANS LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE
Many jurors are confused about the amount of time a defendant
must actually serve in prison if sentenced to "life." This confusion was
understandable before Simmons since jurors were not told two things:
179-80 (1982); Clark v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 201,214, 257 S.E.2d
784,792 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980); Stamper v. Com-
monwealth, 220 Va. 260, 277-78, 257 S.E.2d 808, 821 (1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980).
4 See Straube, The Capital Defendant and Parole Eligibility,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 45, 46 (1992).
5 Id.
6 State v. Torrence, 406 S.E.2d 315, 323 (1991) (Chandler, J.
concurring) (stating, in addition to the court's holding that parole
information is irrelevant to a capital sentence determination, that there
are practical problems such as a trial judge having to find parole
ineligibility prior to the jury even making a preliminary capital sentenc-
ing determination).
7 Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
8 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
9 Since Ball v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 754, 273 S.E.2d 790
(1981)(holding that an attempted robbery is insufficient to support a
capital murder conviction for murder during the course of a robbery), the
Supreme Court of Virginia has granted relief only twice-both times on
fact-specific issues involving application of the triggerman statute. See
Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26,393 S.E.2d 599 (1990); Rogers v.
Commonwealth, 242 Va. 307,410 S.E.2d 621 (1991).
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whether the defendant would be eligible for parole, and if so, when the
defendant would be eligible.
In Virginia there are currently four instances in which the defendant
becomes ineligible for parole. Ineligibility results when a prisoner
sentenced to life escapes from custody; 10 when a person is convicted of
three separate felonies (murder, rape, or armed robbery); 11 when a
person is convicted of three separate felonies involving controlled
substances; 12 or when a person previously paroled from a life sentence
receives a second life sentence.
13
When 1994 draws to a close, the applicability of the four above
instances will be sharply reduced. All crimes committed after January 1,
1995, will render the perpetrator statutorily ineligible forparole. Current
parole law, including provisions for ineligibility, is applicable to crimes
committed prior to that date, no matter when the trial occurs. With the
passage of much of Governor George Allen's Proposal X on September
30, 1994, a life sentence in Virginia will soon always mean life without
any chance of parole.
14
IlI. ESTABLISHING PAROLE INELIGIBILITY AT TRIAL
Once the new statutory abolition of parole applies to all cases in the
courts, the issue of proving parole eligibility under Simmons will no
longer be relevant. Until that time comes, however, the issue of
establishing parole ineligibility is a crucial one, for the benefit to be
directly derived from Simmons can only be realized when the defendant
is shown to be parole ineligible.15
The Court of Appeals of Virginia has stated unequivocally that
courts cannot properly determine parole eligibility. 16 It is the sole
province of members of the Parole Board to make such determinations,
and courts may not intervene absent a showing that the agency's parole
eligibility determination was "arbitrary or capricious."'17 Likewise, the
10 Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(B) (Supp. 1994).
11 Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(B)(1) (Supp. 1994).
12 Va. CodeAnn. § 53.1-151(B)(2) (Supp. 1994) ("manufacturing,
selling, giving, distributing orpossessing with the intent to manufacture,
sell, give or distribute").
13 Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(E) (Supp. 1994).
14 Frank Green, Parole act puts risk in play, critics say, Richmond
Times-Dispatch, Oct. 2, 1994, at Al.
15 For a discussion of the potential impact of the Simmons decision
on those who are technically eligible, see section IX. See also Ramdass
v. Virginia, 114 S. Ct. 2701 (1994), which involved a remand in light of
Simmons for the purpose of determining whether the defendant was in
fact ineligible for parole. The court on remand held that although
Ramdass had two prior separate felony convictions, his third conviction
could not be considered a conviction for purposes of making him parole
ineligible because a judgment had not yet been entered on the guilty
verdict. Ramdass received no relief as a result of Simmons; his case
demonstrates the importance of establishing parole ineligibility at trial
since it is an issue that is sometimes hotly contested.
16 Garrett v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 154, 157, 415 S.E.2d
245,247 (1992) (citingJackson v.Shields,438 F. Supp. 183,184 (1977)).
17 Id.
18 See Eaton, 240 Va. 236,248, 397 S.E.2d 385, 392 (1990), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 623 (1991) ("Information regarding parole is not
relevant evidence to be considered by the jury...."), which cited, among
others: Watkins v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 341,351,385 S.E.2d 50,56
(1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1074 (1990) (Where defense proposed
informing the jury that the defendant would be ineligible for parole for
over 20 years, the court stated that its "decisions have consistently
foreclosed evidence or instructions informing the jury of a defendant's
Supreme Court of Virginia consistently has refused in capital cases to
permit accurate parole information to be communicated to jurors.
18
In order to establish a defendant's parole ineligibility in capital
cases, counsel should ask the Commonwealth to stipulate that the
defendant will never be eligible for parole if convicted of the charge and
sentenced to life in prison rather than death. If the prosecution refuses to
do this, counsel should bring a member of the Parole Board19 to court to
testify that the defendant is in fact parole ineligible.
IV. DOES TEAGUE SAVE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS?
A. The Teague Decision
Who, in addition to those not yet tried, gets the benefit of the
Simmons rule? All death sentenced prisoners who tried to inform their
juries of their parole ineligibility if sentenced to life in prison? Prisoners
in that situation whose cases were on direct appeal when Simmons was
decided on June 17,1994? Those whose cases had already proceeded to
state or federal habeas? The answer depends upon the application of a
retroactivity doctrine announced in 1989 by the United States Supreme
Court in its Teague v. Lane20 decision. Under that doctrine the Attorney
General currently argues against retroactivity of Simmons as its last
chance to avoid resentencing hearings.
2 1
When the United States Supreme Court decided Teague it refused
to allow habeas petitioners to benefit from favorable new decisions, even
those establishing constitutionally mandated rules. Teague was grounded
in a determination that the only purpose of habeas corpus is to deter
egregious errors of which state courts should have been aware at the time
of trial or direct appeal. 22 Consequently many of these potentially life
parole eligibility in the event of a life sentence."); Williams v. Common-
wealth, 234 Va. 168, 178-79, 360 S.E.2d 361, 367-68 (1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1020 (1988) ("Since the Commonwealth is not permit-
ted to argue about the possibility of a reduced sentence by way of
probation, parole, or pardon, because the jury might be inclined to
'handicap' the length of its sentence to factor in that possibility, the
obverse is equally true. If the defendant is permitted to argue his inability
to obtain a reduced sentence, there is an equal danger that the jury may
reduce its sentence because of its feeling thatprobation, parole, or pardon
is not probable.").
19 A representative of the Department of Corrections is also
qualified to make a parole eligibility determination, but the Parole Board,
may supersede such a determination, so use of a Parole Board member
is advised. Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(B)(1) (Supp. 1994).
20 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
21 The state is not required to raise the Teague issue; the state may
waive Teague or simply electnot to assert it. See, e.g., Caspari v.Bohlen,
114 S. Ct. 948, 957 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Teague'!;
nonretroactivity principle "is ajudge-made defense that can be waived.")
Collinsv. Youngblood,497 U.S. 37,41 (1990) (Teague's nonretroactivi'
rule is not jurisdictional, so a court must not "raise and decide the issui:
sua sponte.").
22 For a discussion of how the Rehnquist Court created anI
developed the Teague nonretroactivity doctrine as a means ofeffectivel,
keeping the federal courts from considering every arguably "new lav
claim, see Robert Weisberg, A Great Writ While ItLasted, 81 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 9 (1990). See also James S. Liebman, More That
"Slightly Retro:" The Rehnquist Court's Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurih •
diction in Teaguev. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 537 (199C •
91).
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saving later decisions were to be "new" rules that state courts should not
have anticipated so they would not be given retroactive effect. The Court
held that habeas petitioners could not, during their collateral appeals,
derive any benefit from doctrines which had not been articulated by the
Supreme Court before the petitioner's conviction became final.23 The
Court did not define what constituted a"new" rule.24 The Court did state,
however, that "a case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground
or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government..
.. [or] if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the
defendant's conviction became final." 25
The Court offered two narrowly tailored exceptions to its Teague
nonretroactivity principle.26 First, "a new rule should be applied
retroactively if it places 'certain kinds of primary, private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to
proscribe."' 27 Second,2 8 "a new rule should be applied retroactively if
it requires the observance of 'those procedures that... are "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,"'. 29 or stated differently, retroactive
application is allowed 30 for "watershed rules of criminal procedure"
31
that are "central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt."
'32
Thus, the issue in Virginia cases at state or federal habeas on June 17,
1994, is whether the Simmons requirement that capital juries be informed
of parole ineligibility is a "new rule," and if so, whether any of the
exceptions are applicable. Simmons may not have established anew rule.
23 Teague, 489 U.S. It 295-96. The Court defined "final" to mean
that a judgment had been rendered, all available appeals had been
exhausted, and the time for a petition of certiorarihad elapsed. See Allen
v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 258 n.1 (1986). Accord Caspari v. Bohlen, 114
S. Ct. 948,953 (1994) ("A state conviction and sentence become final for
purposes of retroactivity analysis when the availability of direct appeal
to the state courts has been exhausted and the time for filing a petition for
a writ of certiorari has elapsed or a timely filed petition has been finally
denied.").
24 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 ("It is admittedly often difficult to
determine when a case announces a new rule, and we do not attempt to
define the spectrum of what may or may not constitute a new rule for
retroactivity purposes.").
25 Id. at 301 (emphasis in original).
26 Justice O'Connor, writing for aplurality, claimed to have derived
the two exceptions directly from former Justice Harlan's ideas. Teague,
489 U.S. at 305-07 ("Justice Harlan believed that new rules generally
should not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.... [He]
identified only two exceptions to his general rule .... ).
27 Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401
U.S. 667, 692 (separate opinion of Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)). This first exception appears to follow Harlan's idea
exactly.
28 Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. at 693).
This second exception does not appear to follow Harlan's ideas. See
Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 797, 811 (1992) ("the
Teague decision resembles Justice Harlan's views much like a kidnap-
ping note pasted together from stray pieces of newsprint resembles the
newspaper from which it came").
29 Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401
U.S. at 693 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)
(Cardozo, J.))).
If it did, however, the first of these two exceptions will clearly be of no
use in an attempt to have the Simmons doctrine applied retroactively; the
second exception, however, may prove very useful Some of the Court's
prior Teague doctrine opinions provide insight into how the Simmons
question may be resolved and how defense counsel may persuade courts
that Simmons applies retroactively to all cases.
1. Extending Teague to Capital Cases
Teague was a non-capital case,33 but its reach was extended through
Penry v. Lynaugh34 so that its nonretroactivity doctrine now applies
equally in the capital sentencing context.35 A case which decided the fate
of a moderately retarded death row inmate, Penry turned on two issues:
first, whether the mentally retarded could constitutionally be put to
death; and second, whether such a death sentence would be unconstitu-
tional because it resulted without the jury's having been instructed that
it could consider and give effect to evidence of mental retardation in
mitigation of the death sentence.36 Teague required the Court, when
faced with each of these two issues, to decide as a threshold matter-
before deciding the merits of the issue-whether any ruling favorable to
the defendant would constitute a new rule, and if so, whether an
exception would apply. Therefore, if a ruling in defendant's favor would
30 According toLinkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618,629 (1965), the
Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retroactive application of
laws.
31 Teague,489 U.S. at 311.
32 Id. at 313.
33 Id. at 288, 314 n.2 ("Because petitioner is not under sentence of
death, we need not, and do not, express any views as to how the
retroactivity approach we adopt today is to be applied in the capital
sentencing context.").
34 492U.S. 302 (1989). Penryalso extended the relevant issue from
whether conduct could be proscribed to whether conduct was sufficient
to constitutionally warrant imposition of the death penalty.
35 Penry, 492 U.S. at 313-14 (holding that the "finality concerns"
necessitating Teague's retroactivity approach, as well as the two excep-
tions, apply equally to death row petitioners).
36 Id. at 307. During the penalty phase jurors were instructed to
answer three "special issues" questions relating to deliberateness, future
dangerousness, and unreasonableness. If the jury answered all three
questions affirmatively-which it did-Texas law required imposition
of a death sentence; even a single "no" response mandated a life sentence.
Id. at 310-311. Although this system allowed the consideration of
evidence in mitigation, it did not permit mental retardation evidence to
be given any practical effect. Therefore the jury was able to give no
independent weight to the fact of Penry's mental retardation. This is
apparent when it is noted that the existence of mental retardation could
indicate future dangerousness: "The mitigating evidence concerning
Penry's mental retardation indicated that one effect of his retardation is
his inability to learn from his mistakes." Id. at 323. Since the jury would
as a practical matter have already answered affirmatively on two of the
special issue questions, the answer to the future dangerousness inquiry
was decisive.
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be an unexcepted new rule, the Court would not decide its merits, which
is the practical equivalent of a denial on the merits.37 With regard to the
first issue, the Penry court held that declaring the mentally retarded to be
exempt from the death penalty would be a new rule. If mandated,
however, such a rule would fall within the narrow confines of the first
Teague exception since it would "prohibit- a certain category of punish-
ment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense."'38 With
regard to the second issue-whether requiring that juries be permitted to
give independent weight to mental retardation would be a new rule-the
Court held that it was not a new rule because under precedent existing at
the time Penry's conviction became final,39 the prosecution could not
prevent the presentation, consideration or use of mitigating evidence at
the penalty phase of a capital trial.40
2. Examples of Teague "New Rules"
An examination of three post-Penry cases reveals that quite often
the United States Supreme Court has held that cases have announced new
rules. According to the Court, Butler v. McKellar,4 1 Saffie v. Parks,42
and Sawyerv. Smith43 all announced new rules which did not fall within
either of Teague's two exceptions.
Butler held that Arizona v. Roberson44 was a new rule because the
old rule, Edwards v. Arizona45-holding that police interrogation of an
accused held in continuous custody must cease when he invokes his right
to counsel--could notbe extended to Roberson's application of Edwards
to a case of continuous custody under a second, different charge. The
Court held that the Teague new rule doctrine "validates reasonable,
good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts
even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions.
' 46
37 In order to "eliminate any problems of rendering advisory
opinions" and to "avoidfl the inequity resulting from the uneven appli-
cation of new rules to similarly situated defendants," the Court held that
"habeas corpus cannot be used as a vehicle to create new constitutional
rules of criminal procedure unless those rules would be applied retroac-
tively to all defendants on collateral review through one of the two
exceptions." Teague, 489 U.S. at 316 (emphasis in original).
38 Penry,492 U.5. at 330. The Court proceeded to decide the merits
ofPenry's case and held that death was apermissible form of punishment
even for the mentally retarded. Id. at 330-40.
39 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (emphasis in
original) ("ITMhe Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer... not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor,
any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circum-
stances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
less than death."); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-114 (1982)
(emphasis in original) ("Just as the State may not by statute preclude the
sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the
sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating
evidence."). In Eddings the Court stated that "it was as if the trial judge
had instructed ajury to disregard the mitigating evidence [the defendant)
proffered on his behalf." Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114.
40 Penry, 492 U.S. at 315 ("Penry thus seeks a rule that when such
mitigating evidence is presented, Texas juries must, upon request, be
given jury instructions that make itpossible for them to give effect to that
mitigating evidence in determining whether a defendant should be
sentenced to death." The Court held that the rule sought by Penry was not
a new rule under Teague.).
Parks held that a requirement that jurors be instructed that they
could base their decision on sympathy for the defendant would constitute
a new rule. The old rule, holding that states could not prevent the
presentation, consideration or use of mitigating evidence at the penalty
phase of capital trials, was established by Lockett v. Ohio47 and Eddings
v. Oklahoma.48 Parks argued that a third case (also decided after his
conviction became final), which approved an antisympathy instruction
that prevented jurors from considering emotional responses not based
upon evidence 4 9 would require the Court to find that therefore "the
Constitution requires that the jury be allowed to consider and give effect
to emotions that are based upon mitigating evidence."'50 The Parks court
rejected this argument and held that the existing law could not be
extended, as Parks requested, without making a "negative inference" 51
and without "contraven[ing] well-considered precedents."
'52
Sawyer held that Caldwell v. Mississippi53 established a new rule
because none of the Court's prior reasoning requiring heightened reli-
ability in capital cases had involved improper argument. Caldwell held
that prosecutorial argument which is designed to lessen the jury's sense
of responsibility-for example, by telling jurors that their decision could
be overridden-was unconstitutional. The Sawyer court rejected the
argument that "the second Teague exception should be read to include
new rules of capital sentencing that 'preserve the accuracy and fairness
of capital sentencing judgments' 54 because acceptance of such an
argumentwould amountto overruling the Court's "decision inPenry that
Teague applies to new rules of capital sentencing."55 The dissent
disagreed with the characterization of Caldwell as a new rule: "To reach
this result, the majority misrepresents the source and function of Caldwell's
prohibitions, thereby applying its newly crafted retroactivity bar to a case
in which the State has no legitimate interest in the finality of the death
sentence it obtained through intentional misconduct.
'56
41 494 U.S. 407 (1990). See case summary of Butler, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 2 (1990).
42 494 U.S. 484 (1990). See case summary of Parks, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 3 (1990).
43 497 U.S. 227 (1990). See case summary of Sawyer, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 4 (1990).
44 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
45 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
46 Butler, 494 U.S. at 414.
47 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
48 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
49 California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542 (1987).
50 Parks, 494 U.S. at 494 (emphasis added).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 486. To get relief "Parks must establish that the decision
in Brown did not create a new rule. To do so, Parks must contend that
Lockett and Eddings dictated our reasoning, albeit perhaps not the result,
in Brown. Our discussion above makes it evident that they do not." Id.
at 494.
53 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
54 Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 242 (quoting Brief for Petitioner 30).
55 Id. at 243 (Because Sawyer could "not suggesto any Eighth
Amendment rule that would not be sufficiently 'fundamental' to qualify
for the proposed definition of the exception," the Court stated: "It is
difficult to see any limit to the definition of the second exception if casl
as proposed by petitioner. All of our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
concerning capital sentencing is directed toward the enhancement oJ
reliability and accuracy in some sense.").
56 Id. at 245-46 (Marshall, 3., dissenting).
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3. A Pleasant Surprise: Stringer v. Black
57
After holding three times in 1990 that new rules had been an-
nounced, the Court two years later decided Stringer v. Black, which
involved a determination that a doctrine did not constitute a new rule. In
Stringer at issue was the constitutionality of a jury instruction allowing
imposition of a death sentence in cases where the murder is found to be
"especially heinous, atrocious or cruel."'58 An earlier case had held a
similar vileness predicate to be unconstitutionally vague, 59 but this rule
had not yet been applied to the precise Stringer language (and it was not
applied until after Stringer's conviction became final). The case so
applying the language held that the "especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel" instruction was invalid,60 and this decision was held in Stringer
not to be a new rule because it was "controlled" by precedent.
61
In Teague the plurality opinion "expressed no views regarding
how the retroactivity approach" would be applied, but it did note-as the
Penry court was quick to point out-that "a criminal judgment necessar-
ily includes the sentence imposed, and that collateral challenges to
sentences 'delay the enforcement of the judgment at issue and decrease
the possibility that "there will at some point be the certainty that comes
with an end to litigation."'
' 62
B. Is Simmons a "New" Rule?
In assessing Teague's impact on Simmons, one must first determine
whether ornotSimmons has expounded anew rule. A solid argument can
be made that Simmons does not establish a new rule at all, that Simmons
merely reinforces the established due process principle that a defendant
at risk of forfeiting his life has a right to rebut the state's case against him.
Supreme Court jurisprudence finally decided prior to Simmons had
already firmly established a right-of-rebuttal principle; in fact, Simmons
may very well have been decided on the basis of two opinions in
particular. 63 Gardner v. Florida64 stands for the proposition that a
defendant is denied due process and may not be sentenced to death when
the sentence is based, even partially, on information which the defendant
did not have occasion to explain or deny.65 In Skipper v. South
Carolina66 the Court held that a state trial court's refusal to admit good
behavior (in prison) evidence during thepenalty phase of trial constituted
a denial of due process. The Court explained that "[w]here the prosecu-
tion specifically relies on a prediction of future dangerousness in asking
for the death penalty.., elemental due process require[s] thatadefendant
not be sentenced to death 'on the basis of information which he had no
opportunity to deny or explain.'
' ' 67
57 112S. Ct. 1130 (1992).
58 Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1134.
59 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
60 Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 360 (1988).
61 Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1135-36 ("Maynard was.., for purposes
of Teague, controlled by Godfrey, and it did not announce a new rule.").
62 Penry, 492 U.S. at 313 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 314 n.2
(quoting Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 25 (1963 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting))).
63 Simmons, 114 S. Ct. 2187, 2194 (1994) (plurality opinion)
(stating that the two cases "reached a similar conclusion" and that like
Simmons, the defendants in the other two cases were "prevented from
rebutting information that the sentencing authority considered, and upon
which it may have relied, in imposing the sentence of death").
64 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
65 Id. at 355-62 (plurality opinion). Here the judge relied, during
Perhaps the best argument for Simmons not being a new rule comes
directly from the Court's opinion: "The principle announced in Gardner
was reaffirmed in Skipper, and it compels our decision today."
68 The
state would argue, of course, that this language is not strong enough in
light of a particular example of the Court's post-Penry language:
[T]he fact that a court says that its decision is within the
'logical compass' of an earlier decision, or indeed that it is
'controlled' by a prior decision, is not conclusive for purposes
of deciding whether the current decision is a 'new rule' under
Teague. Courts frequently view their decisions as being
'controlled' or 'governed' by prior opinions even when aware
of reasonable contrary conclusions reached by other courts.69
The position of defendants attempting to have Simmons deemed not
to be a new rule, on the other hand, is improved by the following
language:
Teague does bear on applications of law to fact which result in
the announcement of a new rule. Whether the prisoner seeks
the application of an old rule in a novel setting.., depends in
large part on the nature of the rule. If the rule in question is one
which of necessity requires a case-by-case examination of the
evidence, then we can tolerate a number of specific applica-
tions without saying that those applications themselves create
a new rule. The rule of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307
(1979), is an example. By its very terms it provides a general
standard which calls for some examination of the facts ... so
of course there will be variations from case to case. Where the
beginning point is a rule of this general application, a rule
designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of
factual contexts, it will be the infrequent case that yields a
result so novel that it forges a new rule, one not dictated by
precedent. 70
It is possible that habeas petitioners are entitled to benefit from
Simmons even if it is determined to have established a new rule. In an
argument recently presented to the Supreme Court for consideration, the
following reasoning-which assumed arguendo that Teague was appli-
cable and that Simmons constituted a "new rule"--was introduced to
show that such a new Simmons rule should fall within the second of
Teague's exceptions. 7' The reasoning was in the form of a comparison.
the sentencing phase, upon a presentence investigation report which was
never made available to the defendant, and which he could therefore
never rebut.
66 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
67 Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5 n.1 (quoting Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362).
68 Simmons, 114 S. Ct. at 2194 (plurality opinion of Blackmun, J.,
joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.). The concurring opinion of
O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist and Kennedy, JJ., also rested on
fundamental due process grounds and cited Gardner and Skipper. Id. at
2200-01.
69 Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407,415 (1990).
70 Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2499 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted).
71 Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236,397 S.E.2d 385 (1990),
cert. denied, 1994 WL 388345 (U.S.Va. (Oct. 31, 1994)).
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Gideon v. Wainwright72 falls under exception two73 because it is a
"watershed rule of criminal procedure," a "bedrock procedural ele-
ment"; 74 therefore Simmons should also fall under exception two since
it "established even more of a 'bedrock' principle than the right to
counsel in that the right to be heard at all on rebuttal is more fundamental
than the right to a lawyer to assist being heard."75 The reasoning
continued with a comparison of Simmons (without which "the likelihood
of a sentencing decision based on wrong facts is so great" 76) to McKoy
v. North Carolina77 (which was applied retroactively under exception
two78 because it "ensures the ability of the jury to reach an individualized
verdict based on mitigating evidence" 79).
McKoy was decided the way it was in order to remain consistent
with Mills v. Maryland.80 In Mills the Court reaffirmed that in a capital
case the sentencer must be allowed to consider-in mitigation--"any
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances
of the offense that the defendant proffers as abasis for a sentence less than
death."8 1 Mills arose out of a statute which required all twelve jurors to
agree on the existence of a particular mitigating circumstance before the
jury was allowed to consider any evidence in mitigation.
When McKoy was decided less than two years later, a surprisingly
similarproblem was exposed. Although North Carolina allowed the jury
to vote for life solely on the basis that the aggravating factors did not
support a death sentence (even if no mitigating factors were found),
reasonable jurors might also have concluded that the state imposed a
unanimity requirement: unless the jury unanimously found a certain
mitigating factor to exist, all evidence supporting such a mitigating factor
would be deemed legally "irrelevant" and would not be considered.
82
Because bothMills andMcKoy were held to be governed by Teague
as new rules but excepted by its "implicit in the concept of ordered
72 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment guarantees that an
indigent accused is entitled to counsel).
73 In an attempt to outline the "precise contours" of the second
Teague exception, the Court stated in Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484
(1990), that "we have usually cited Gideon v. Wainwright, holding that
a defendant has the right to be represented by counsel in all criminal trials
for serious offenses, to illustrate the type of rule coming within the
exception." Parks, 494 U.S. at 495 (citation omitted).
74 See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311-12 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. 667,
693-694 (1971).
75 Petitioner's Reply to Brief in Opposition at 6 n.1, Eaton v.
Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236,397 S.E.2d 385 (1990), cert. denied, 1994
WL 388345 (U.S.Va. (Oct. 31, 1994)).
76 Id.
77 494 U.S. 433 (1990).
78 McKoy was retroactively applied in Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d
448 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 510 (1992).
79 Petitioner's Reply to Brief in Opposition at 6 n.1, Eaton v.
Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236,397 S.E.2d 385 (1990), cert. denied, 1994
WL 388345 (U.S.Va. (Oct. 31, 1994)).
80 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
81 Mills, 486 U.S. at 374 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 110 (1982) (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978)
(plurality opinion))). The Court noted, too, that the corollary that the
sentencer cannot refuse to consider this type of evidence in mitigation
had been long established. Id.
82 McKoy, 494 U.S. at 435-39.
83 It should be noted that even if the Simmons decision is held by
the Court to have not announced anew rule, it may still be deemed anew
liberty" exception, precedent may dictate that Simmons should also not
fall victim to Teague's nonretroactivity rule.
83
Simmons may be found tobenonretroactiveunderreasoning similar
to that employed in Saffle and Sawyer (and perhaps also Butler). Or it
may apply to habeas petitioners under the reasoning of Penry and
Stringer. Whatever the result, Simmons demonstrates how essential it is
that attorneys representing prisoners in collateral proceedings coordinate
their efforts, seek assistance, and craft arguments for retroactive applica-
tion with all the skill at their command.
V. NO TEAGUE ON STATE HABEAS
The fact that Teague involved a federal habeas corpus appeal might
be crucial in determining the effect of Teague on the Simmons rule for
cases which were on state habeas at the time Simmons was decided.
Arguably no state habeas appellant should be barred by Teague from
benefitting from Simmons.84 Only if a state had adopted its own doctrine
analogous to Teague-one applicable in cases on state habeas appeal as
opposed to appeals at federal habeas-should the nonretroactivity doc-
trine come into play. 85 Virginia does not seem to have such a doctrine,86
although the Attorney General claims that Hawks v. Cox87 is such a
Teague analogue.
88
Hawks was decided 19 years before Teague and involved aprisoner's
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Virginia. The petition was
denied on the basis that the arguments presented had been previously
litigated by the same court on direct appeal.
89
rule later in another case if the granting of relief there would require
application of the old rule "in a novel setting, thereby extending the
precedent." Stringer v.Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130,1135 (1992) (citingButler
v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414-41 (1990)).
84 See, e.g., Mary C. Hutton,Retroactivity in the States: The Impact
ofTeague v. Laneon StatePostconvictionRemedies, 44Ala. L., Rev. 421,
423-24 (1993) ("its restrictions apply only to federal habeas cases");
John Blume & William Pratt, Understanding Teague v.Lane, 18 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 325,353 n.228 (1990-9 1) ("Teague says nothing
about the availability of retroactive benefit of new rules of constitutional
criminal procedure in state post-conviction proceedings.").
85 Hutton, supra, at 424 ("states [have] the opportunity to follow
Teague or to develop an approach to retroactivity which enables them to
fulfill the requirements of their state constitutions, statutes, and case
law") (citations omitted). See Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.01-654-668 (1992).
See also Va. Const. art. I, § 9.
86 Hutton, supra, at 473 ("Virginia habeas corpus statutes are silent
on the issue of retroactivity.").
87 211 Va. 91, 175 S.E.2d 271 (1970).
88 Hutton, supra, at 458. According to Hutton's analysis, like "the
majority of states [Virginia] has not had to address the retroactivity issue
since Teague was decided" and therefore has "the opportunity to depart
from Teague's inflexibility and to adopt a rule of partial or total
retroactivity." Since Teague's rule was handed down by the highest
court in the land, and notby a legislativebody, presumably states' highest
courts could also chisel away at the effectiveness of habeas proceedings
by deciding to judicially enact Teague. Arguably, however, a state must
be explicit about such a decision.
89 Hawks, 211 Va. at 95, 175 S.E.2d at 274.
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VI. DOES HAWKS V. COX HELP THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL ON STATE HABEAS?
Although decidedyears before Teague, on the surfaceHawks seems
to have the same holding. But upon closer examination it becomes clear
that Virginia does in fact not yet have a Teague analogue, at least not one
established by Hawks. Crucial to the decision in Hawks is language
holding that "[a]bsent a change of circumstances, previous determina-
tion of the issues by either state or federal courts will be conclusive." 90
In future Simmons litigation at state habeas, an important question will
be whether the Simmons rule is sufficient to constitute a "change of
circumstances" of the type anticipated by Hawks.9 1
Whether or not the Supreme Court of Virginia decides this issue, it
is well settled that the court may reconsider a conviction on the basis of
a decision of the United States Supreme Court which is held to be
retroactively applicable. 92 In fact the Supreme Court of Virginia has
applied one of its own intervening decisions retroactively. On the basis
of the law of Peyton v. French,93 the court granted relief in Gogley v.
Peyton94 to a state habeas prisoner whose conviction had become final
before French was decided. This meant that French, an intervening
Supreme Court of Virginia case, was applied retroactively to a case at
Virginia state habeas. Since it was done in Gogley, perhaps it will also
be done in a case applying Simmons.
Since the Supreme Court of Virginia applied an intervening deci-
sion retroactively in Gogley, it would seem inconsistent for the court-
when faced with Simmons-to hold that it does not constitute a change
in circumstances of the type contemplated by Hawks.
In any event, a contrary interpretation would only mean that a
Simmons claim was not cognizable at Virginia state habeas. This would
not bar the claim from consideration in federal court.95 Thus, provided
the issue was not defaulted, Simmons claims are eligible for presentation
in federal habeas proceedings whether Hawks bars tfleir consideration at
state habeas or not.
VII. SIMMONS FOR THE "PAROLE ELIGIBLE" IN VIRGINIA
A hypothetical capital juror, confronted with only two possible
verdicts, death or life imprisonment, faces a stressful experience in any
event. Deprived of information about the meaning of a life sentence, the
typical juror suffers more stress, he may also make the wrong decision,
one he would not have made had he been fully informed. It would be
tremendously upsetting for that juror to agonize over the decision to
90 Id.
91 The argument has been made that "[i]f an intervening United
States Supreme Court decision does not represent the change in circum-
stances exception contemplated by Hawks, then the exception is mean-
ingless." Petitioner's Reply to Brief in Opposition at 2, Eaton v.
Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236,397 S.E.2d 385 (1990), cert. denied, 1994
WL 388345 (U.S.Va. (Oct. 31, 1994)).
92 Smith v. Superintendent, 214 Va. 359, 200 S.E.2d 523 (1973).
93 207 Va. 73, 147 S.E.2d 739 (1966) (holding that a guardian ad
litem must be appointed in juvenile proceedings).
94 208 Va. 679, 160 S.E.2d 746 (1968) (decided more than two
years before Hawks).
95 See Spencer v. Murray, 5 F.3d 758 (4th Cir. 1993) (Spencerl),
and case summary of Spencer I, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 2,
p. 14, 16 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original) (1993):
The Spencer I court, however, made it clear that claims
presented to the Supreme Court of Virginia and rejected on
sentence a man to death when he truly had sympathy for the pathetic and
tortured life the defendant had lived. On the other hand, the juror would
know that an innocent person has died and that he, the juror, must be
concerned about the other innocent people in the community who could
be at risk if the defendant were released. Fearing the worst, with little
other information about the defendant's future to guide him, the juror
would cast his vote for death.
At the heart of Simmons is a concern that jury members may
sentence a man to death for whom they would not choose death if they
had more accurate sentencing information. The case itself and the
problem it seeks to solve raise grave questions in Virginia jurisprudence
about the reliability of the death sentence itself, the constitutionality of
the future dangerousness aggravating factor as it has been applied in the
Commonwealth, and the state of mitigation evidence.
As will be shown, the case for construing Simmons to require that
juries be entitled to accurate parole law information in all capital cases
is even more compelling in Virginia than in South Carolina. The issues
should be litigated until definitively resolved by the United States
Supreme Court.
VIII. WHEN IS PAROLE "AVAILABLE" IN VIRGINIA
The United States Supreme Court in Simmons specifically man-
dated parole eligibility instructions for defendants who are ineligible for
parole in the event of a sentence of life imprisonment. The Court did not
make any findings that directly apply to a defendant who may be eligible
for parole. The issue then becomes a question of when parole is truly
"available" to the extent that due process no longer requires juries to
consider it in rebuttal of the state's case for death. Is the point automati-
cally reached if the possibility of parole is specifically provided for in the
state's statute? Is it reached even if the defendant's only chance for
release is so far in the future that his opportunity to be dangerous then is
severely decreased, if not eliminated?
In Virginia trials involving offenses committed before January 1,
1995,96 some capital defendants sentenced to life in prison will not be
eligible for parole,97 some will be eligible forparole in 25 years and some
will be eligible in 30 years. For those who are parole eligible, "good time"
credits can only reduce these penalties by a maximum of 5 days per
month. 98 Thus, the minimum amount of time that a defendant convicted
of capital murder and sentenced to life will spend in prison is 20 years and
10 months.
direct appeal were still procedurally eligible to be considered
on the merits by federal habeas courts. Quoting Grundler v.
North Carolina, [283 F.2d 798 (4th Cir. 1960),] the court
stated: "If a question is presented and adjudicated by the state's
highest court once, it is not necessary to urge it upon them a
second time under an alternative procedure." [Id. at 800.]
Thus, the Spencer I court indicates that the Hawks argument
taken by the Attorney General (i.e., that no state habeas relief
is available on claims previously rejected on direct appeal to
the Supreme Court of Virginia) is still valid.
96 Frank Green, Parole act puts risk in play, critics say, Richmond
Times-Dispatch, Oct. 2, 1994, et al.
97 See Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(B) (Supp. 1994).
98 See Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-199 (1988); § 53.1-201 (1991).
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In the wake of Simmons and the clear implications that it has for
capital sentencing beyond its narrow holding, courts have begun to
struggle with the threshold question of whether and when parole is
"available." The Court stated in Simmons that "[b]ecause truthful
information of parole ineligibility allows the defendant to 'deny or
explain' the showing of future dangerousness, due process plainly
requires that he be allowed to bring it to the jury's attention by way of
argument by defense counsel or an instruction from the court."99 The
question then becomes at what point the defendant is "ineligible" such
that the factors compelling the Simmons decision require that parole
information be given. In terms of those factors, the line between
eligibility for parole at age 86 and ineligibility is a fairly arbitrary one to
draw.
At least one state has already decided that Simmons requires the
lower court to instruct the jury that a sentence of life imprisonment would
mean that the defendant would not be eligible for parole until he was an
old man. 100 In that case, the Supreme Court of New Mexico said:
Although Simmons did not decide whether the Eighth Amend-
ment requires a jury to be informed of the meaning of a life
sentence, it reveals that notions of fundamental fairness em-
bodied in the Due Process Clause require that the defendantbe
allowed to rebut, with all relevant mitigating evidence, the
prosecutor's argument that the defendant's future dangerous-
ness is cause for the death penalty, and relevant mitigating
evidence includes the length of incarceration facing the defen-
dant if he is not sentenced to death.'0'
In this case, the defendant would not have been eligible for parole
until he reached the age of 86.
A study has shown that Virginia jurors believe that a defendant
sentenced to life imprisonment will be inprison for amuch shorterperiod
of time than is actually the case.102 The study also indicated that parole
eligibility and the likely period of incarceration were key factors for
Virginia jurors in their sentencing determination.
IX. SIMMONS SHOULD APPLY TO VIRGINIA CAPITAL
CASES, EVEN WHERE PAROLE IS AVAILABLE.
Even assuming parole to be "available" in certain cases in Virginia,
Simmons did not foreclose its extension to such cases.103 The United
99 See Simmons, 114 S.Ct. at 2196.
100 Clark v. Tansy, 882 P.2d 527 (N.M. 1994).
101 Id. at 533.
102 The Meaning of 'Life' for Virginia Jurors and Its Effect on
Reliability in Capital Sentencing, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1605, 1623 (1989)
(quoting National Legal Research Group, Inc., Jury Research and Trial
Simulation Services, Report on Jurors' Attitudes Concerning the Death
Penalty (Dec. 6, 1988) (unpublished report).
103 See generally case summary of Simmons, Capital Defense
Digest, this issue. (Justice Blackmun's statements in Simmons even
support the idea that such evidence ought to be admissible. "[S]uch an
instruction is more accurate than no instruction at all, which leaves the
jury to speculate whether 'life imprisonment' means life without parole
or something else." Simmons, 114 S.Ct. at 2195.
104 However, see Ramdass v. Commonwealth, No. 930693, (1994)
In Ramdass, the defendant argued that he was not eligible for parole
because he had previous convictions for murder and two armed robber-
ies. Section 53.1-151(B) of the Virginia Code establishes a defendant's
ineligibility for parole when that defendant has three prior convictions
for serious felonies such as these. The Supreme Court of Virginia found
States Supreme Court focused on the South Carolina death penalty
scheme in its holding in Simmons, a plan very different from that found
in Virginia. Differences in the administration of the capital murder
statutes in the two states point to an even greaterneed for Virginia jurors
to have accurate parole information in all cases. The argument that
Simmons applies, even when parole is "available," is strong in Vir-
ginia. 104
Denial ofparole information to Virginiajurors is a more significant
factor undermining due process because of the relative centrality of
future dangerousness in Virginia's capital scheme, and, in addition,
because the error is but one of many deficiencies in the administration the
future dangerousness aggravating factor. Others include the absence of
meaningful adversarial testing, absence of a standard of proof for
unadjudicated misconduct, and the admission of irrelevant evidence.
Denial of the right to present accurate parole information, even for
the "parole eligible" under Virginia's particular statutory scheme, is an
open issue. It is ripe for litigation on the grounds used to decide Simmons
and on two other grounds expressly left open by the Simmons court.
A. GardnerlDue Process Rationale
All seven of the members of the United States Supreme Court
constituting the majority in Simmons decided the case on the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause requirement that defendants have the
right to rebut the state's case for death. 105 In the decision, the Court
focused on the South Carolina death penalty scheme and its use of future
dangerousness as an aggravating factor. South Carolina statutes, how-
ever, do not provide that the jury must find future dangerousness as a
specific aggravating factor.10 6 Prosecutors frequently offer evidence of
future dangerousness because the state's evidence in the sentencing
phase can extend beyond the listed aggravating factors. 107 The Virginia
scheme, in contrast to that of South Carolina, makes proof of future
dangerousness or "vileness" a prerequisite to eligibility for a sentence of
death. The due process right to rebut the state's case for death in Virginia
is not, as it is in South Carolina, the right to rebut evidence of a factor that
the sentencing jury is permitted to consider. Rather, it is the right to rebut
evidence of a factor the jury is required to find as a precondition to the
imposition of a death sentence.
108
thatRamdass was parole eligible, however, because the trial court did not
enter judgment on the verdict of conviction for one of the armed
robberies. The court upheld the trial court's decision to withhold
accurate parole information from the jury because of this conceivable
parole eligibility.
105 Simmons, 114 S.Ct. at 2190.
106 S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C) (Supp. 1993).
107SeeT. Eisenberg and Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror
Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1993).
108 "The penalty of death shall not beimposed unless the Common-
wealth shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability
based upon evidence of the prior history of the defendant or of the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense of which he is
accused that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing serious threat to society, or that his conduct in
committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or aggravated
battery to the victim." Va. Code § 19.2-264.4(C). See also case summary
of Tuilaepa v. California, Capital Defense Digest, this issue (discussing
the importance of the eligibility factors in capital statutes).
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The Virginia Code makes proof of future dangerousness equivalent
to that required to prove an element of the offense. The statute requires
that the Commonwealth prove either future dangerousness or vileness
beyond a reasonable doubt. This statutory requirement that the Com-
monwealth prove future dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt alone
creates a strong argument that Virginia jurors are entitled to accurate
parole information in every case.
B. Eighth Amendment Reliability Grounds
The Simmons Court expressly did not decide if the trial courts must
disclose parole information because of the Eighth Amendment "height-
ened reliability" requirement. 109 All of the grounds for urging the
communication of parole information, including the grounds relied onby
the United States Supreme Court in Simmons and those expressly left
undecided, relate in some way to the reliability of capital sentencing.
Two members of the Court, however, saw this as a discrete issue and
wrote separately in Simmons in support. 110 Consequently, it is worth
understanding the "heightened reliability" 111 requirement and urging
Simmons' application to all cases on these grounds.
Arguably, the future dangerousness aggravating factor leads to
unreliable results whenever states choose to utilize it. After all, this factor
calls for almost complete speculation in the best of circumstances.
Although the Court upheld the use of future dangerousness as an
aggravating factor in Barefoot v. Estelle,t t 2 it scrutinized the manner in
which a state may use this aggravator in Simmons. Here again, the case
for applying Simmons is even more compelling in Virginia than in South
Carolina, given the centrality of future dangerousness to the capital
sentencing scheme in Virginia and the lack of reliability of much of
Virginia's procedures for applying the factor.
The United States Supreme Court has mandated various safeguards
in its death penalty cases and based these holdings on the Eighth
Amendment reliability in sentencing requirement. 113 In these instances,
the Court has emphasized the importance of the procedure by which the
state seeks to impose the death penalty. In California v. Ramos,114 the
Court stated:
In ensuring that the death penalty is not meted out arbitrarily
or capriciously, the Court's principal concern has been more
with the procedure by which the State imposes the death
sentence than with the substantive factors the State lays before
the jury as a basis for imposing death, once it has been
determined that the defendant falls within the category of
persons eligible for the death penalty.' 5
109 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)
(holding that "the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a
sentence of imprisonment, however long.") and Caldwell v. Mississippi,
472 U.S. 320 (1985)(holding that the prosecutor's argument undermined
the reliability of the death sentence).
110 In fact, two justices concurred in a separate opinion which
emphasized that the need for heightened reliability mandated this
disclosure of parole information. See 114 S.Ct. at 2198 (Souter, J.
concurring).
111 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
112 463 U.S. 880, 896-97 (1983) (The Court had earlier approved
the entire Texas statutory scheme, including the future dangerousness
factor, in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976)).
113 See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
114 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
115 Id. at 999.
116 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
The Court explained in Woodson v. North Carolina1 16 that "the
penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprison-
ment, however long."'117 Moreover, the Court, in Lockett v. Ohio,1t 8
clarified that "[w]e are satisfied that this qualitative difference between
death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when the
death sentence is imposed."1 19
In an effort to ensure reliability, the Supreme Court should require
the lower courts to provide the jury with the greatest amount of relevant
data that defense counsel can make available, including accurate incar-
ceration information. In the past, the Eighth Amendment reliability
requisite has influenced the Court to decide that the lower courts should
err on the side of giving the jury more information instead of less. In
California v. Ramos, the Court upheld the state's right to tell the jury that
the defendant's sentence could be commuted by the governor if he were
sentenced to life in prison without the opportunity for parole. 120 In that
case, the Court emphasized that the instruction was constitutional be-
cause the Briggs Instruction [governor's right to commute] does not limit
the jury to two sentencing choices, neither of which may be appropriate.
Instead it places before the jury an additional element to be considered,
along with many other factors, in determining which sentence is appro-
priate under the circumstances of the defendant's case.
121
If the sentencing body chooses death as the appropriate punishment
for the defendant when it would not have chosen death had it realized the
defendant would be in prison until he was 73, then the state has not
reliably proven that death is the appropriate sentence. In Caldwell v.
Mississippi,122 the United States Supreme Court held that a court cannot
allow ajury to believe that the final determination of the defendant's guilt
will rest with an appellate court and not the jury itself.123 Key to this
determination was the Court's finding that such a sentence was not truly
reliable. 124 In fact, the Court stated that " [tihe death sentence that would
emerge from such a sentencing proceeding would simply not represent
a decision that the State had demonstrated the appropriateness of the
defendant's death." 125 In addition, the Court found that the "[b]ias could
similarly stem from the fact that some jurors may correctly assume that
a sentence of life in prison could not be increased to a death sentence on
appeal." 126 The harshest result seems safest but is unconstitutionally
unreliable, much like the determination that Virginia jurors have made
in the past.
127
Moreover, it makes no sense not to tell the jury the relevant facts
about the future incarceration opportunities for the defendant. The
United States Supreme Court stated in Gardner v. Florida
128
117 Id. at 305.
118 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
119 Id. at 604.
120 463 U.S. at 1001-02.
121 Id. at 1007.
122 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
123 Id. at 323.
124 Id. at 332.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 See Amici Curiae Brief of Donna L. Markle and Patricia Ann
Knipfer in Support of Petitioner in Simmons v. South Carolina in which
two jurors in the trial of Dennis Eaton, a Virginia prisoner sentenced to
death under circumstances virtually identical to those of Simmons,
explained that it would have been very important for them to know
whether the defendant was parole eligible to aid in the sentencing
determination.
128 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
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If it [the information the State does not want to disclose] tends
to tip the scales in favor of life, presumably the information
would be favorable and there would be no reason why it should
not be disclosed. On the other hand, if it is the basis for a death
sentence, the interest in reliability plainly outweighs the State's
interest in preserving the availability of comparable informa-
tion in other cases.1
29
This reliability is important not only to the defendant whose life
hangs in the balance but also to the rest of society whose members are
responsible for his life and death. For this reason, reliability and
humanity must remain the supreme goals of the procedure the state
employs in the sentencing phase of the capital trial. The Supreme Court
has supported this proposition in the past, and stated in Gardner v.
Florida that
[firom the point of view of the defendant, it [the death penalty]
is different in both its severity and its finality. From the point
of view of society, the action of the sovereign in taking the life
of one of its citizens also differs dramatically from any other
legitimate state action. It is of vital importance to the defen-
dant and to the community that any decision to impose the
death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than
caprice or emotion. 30
Knowledge of all of the relevant facts enables the jury to properly
represent society and make a careful decision on behalf of the commu-
nity. Without that knowledge, jurors may regret the decision they made
and feel that justice was not served.
131
C. Reliability In Virginia/South Carolina
The relevant case law indicates that the courts of South Carolina are
more concerned with ensuring evidentiary reliability during the penalty
phase of the capital trial than are the courts of Virginia. In addition,
reliability in Virginia has already been undermined in several respects
aside from the parole law question.
1. Absence of Meaningful Adversarial Testing
Denial of parole eligibility is not the only factor that has under-
mined thereliability of future dangerousness determination in the typical
Virginia case. The fact that the trial court has considered evidence that
is improper or untested has not prevented the Supreme Court of Virginia
from upholding a death sentence in the past. In Johnson v. Missis-
sippi,132 the United States Supreme Court found that the state could not
129 Id. at 359.
130 Id. at 357-58.
131 See Amici Curiae Brief of Donna L. Markle and Patricia Ann
Knipfer in Support of Petitioner in Simmons v. South Carolina.
132 486 U.S. 578, 586 (1988).
133 246 Va. 260,425 S.E.2d 636 (1993).
134 Id. at 264,435 S.E.2d at 638.
135 Fora good overall analysis ofunadjudicated acts in Virginia, see
Anything Someone Else Says Can and Will be Used Against You in a
Court of Law: The Use of Unadjudicated Acts in Capital Sentencing,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 31, (1993).
136 225 Va. 564,304 S.E.2d 644 (1983).
use a conviction that had been reversed as the basis for a death sentence
because the defendant still had the presumption of innocence. Yet in
Dubois v. Commonwealth,133 thejudge noted charges against the defen-
dant that had been nolle prossed and presumed him guilty although he
was never convicted of the crime.134 Moreover, the court included a
statement by the defendant that he made his living selling drugs in its
reasons for finding future dangerousness. The defendant had never been
convicted of selling drugs so any evidence that might show that he did in
fact sell drugs was completely untested, even assuming some relevance
to future dangerousness.
2. Absence of Standard of Proof for
Unadjudicated Acts
The Commonwealth allows the use of unadjudicated acts to prove
future dangerousness. 135 In LeVasseur v. Commonwealth,136 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia upheld the right of the Commonwealth to
introduce unadjudicated acts at the sentencing phase of the capital
penalty trial to prove future dangerousness. 137 The court looked to the
holding of Jurek v. Texas 138 to determine that the jury is entitled to "all
possible relevant information ' '139 and decided that unadjudicated acts
could fit within this realm of relevant information. The Virginia courts
have not, however, articulated a standard of proof by which thejury must
find the defendant committed the act in order to utilize it in their
sentencing determination. A Virginia prosecutor can offer any evidence
of any degree of reliability about an act of the defendant and jurors can
use it in their sentencing determination even if the juror thinks that only
a slight probability exists that the defendant actually committed the act.
In a recent Virginia case, Breard v. Commonwealth,
140 the Com-
monwealth introduced evidence about assaults on two other women,
allegedly committed by the defendant, to show "future dangerousness."
Breard requested ajury instruction that the jury must find these assaults
occurred beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury could consider this
information against him. The trial court refused and the Supreme Court
of Virginia upheld its decision. 141 The court has yet to require any
standard of proof. The South Carolina Courts also allow the state to
present evidence of unadjudicated acts in the sentencing phase of a
capitalmurder trial. The South Carolina courts, however, require that the
jury find that the defendant committed the acts by clear and convincing
evidence. In State v. Middleton,142 the South Carolina Supreme Court
found that ajudge must charge the jury with specific instructions as to the
manner in which they process and weigh the evidence. The Supreme
Court allowed admission of a confession in which the defendant con-
fessed to other crimes even though the lower court had not required the
jury to find that the commission of the act met a certain standard of proof.
The court did note, however, that the judge charged the jury that they
137 Id. at 593-94, 304 S.E.2d at 660.
138 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
139 LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 594, 304 S.E.2d at 660.
140 248 Va. 68,445 S.E.2d 670 (1994). See also case summary of
Breard, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
141 See case summary of Breard v. Commonwealth, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue (discussing the suggestion in analogous
Virginia law that the Commonwealth should be required to prove
unadjudicated acts by the preponderance of the evidence standard of
proof).
142 368 S.E.2d 457 (S.C. 1988).
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could not consider the unadjudicated acts as evidence of an aggravating
circumstance relevant to capital sentencing. If the state offers
unadjudicated acts as proof of an aggravating factor, the state must
present the evidence in conformity with the requirements of with State
v. Conyers,143 where the South Carolina Supreme Court said that
"[b]ecause of the potential for prejudice from the admission of testimony
of other crimes, it is generally held that proof of the other crime must be
clear and convincing." 144 This rule obviously reflects a concern, absent
in Virginia, that such evidence be reliably established before being used
to support a death sentence.
3. Admission of Irrelevant Evidence
Aside from reliability problems, a great deal of the evidence
presented to prove future dangerousness in Virginia is irrelevant in all
aspects save prejudicing the sentencing body. In Dubois v. Common-
wealth, the trial court considered and mentioned the fact that the
defendant had fathered nine children but had not supported any of
them.145 The Supreme Court of Virginia also upheld all of the evidence
utilized to prove future dangerousness in Strickler v. Commonwealth,
146
even though this evidence included the defendant's attempt to use the
victim's bank card at alater point in time and his convictionfor tampering
with a vending machine. In King v. Commonwealth,147 the prosecution
presented evidence of a bigamy conviction, 148 unauthorized possession
of United States currency, 149 possession of drug paraphernalia 150 and
use of intoxicants15 1 in their efforts to show that the defendant might be
dangerous in the future. Although few people would consider these
actions to be those of an upstanding member of the community, it is
difficult to see how any of them show aprobability that defendant "would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
serious threat to society. '152 The potential prejudice from the use of such
evidence, however, further undermines the reliability of future danger-
ousness determinations in Virginia and strengthens the argument for
parole evidence disclosure based on this ground left open in Simmons.
Although the court gave a cautionary instruction in King, it is nearly
impossible to stop a juror from considering that which he has heard.
In contrast, the South Carolina Supreme Court has expressed
interest in ensuring that the evidence presented is relevant. In State v.
Green,153 the court allowed evidence of other crimes but noted that
"[t]hese crimes [similar crimes that the defendant may have attempted]
143 233 S.E.2d 95 (S.C. 1977).
144 Id. at 96.
145 Dubois v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. at 266,435 S.E.2d at 638-
39.
146 241 Va. 482, 496-97 404 S.E.2d 227, 236 (1991).
t47 243 Va. 353,416 S.E.2d 669 (Va. 1992).
148 Id. at 370, 416 S.E.2d at 678.
149 Id. at 370, 416 S.E.2d at 679.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(c).
153 392 S.E.2d 157 (S.C. 1990).
154 Id. at 163 (citation omitted).
155 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) ('The need for
treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of respect due
the uniqueness of the individual is far more important than in noncapital
cases.")
156 Id. at 604.
157 SeeLockett, 438 U.S. at 605 (1978) ("a statute that prevents the
sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent mitigating weight
may not be used to prove statutory aggravating circumstances. Instead,
the judge must properly limit the jury's consideration of these offenses
to evidence of appellant's characteristics as they may bear logical
relevance to the crime."
'154
South Carolina's attempts to ensure that the evidence in aggravation
that the jury hears is both relevant and reliable shows a much more
determined effort than that of Virginia to treat the defendant with a
"degree of respect due the uniqueness of the individual."'155 For this
reason, the Simmons holding and the importance it places on fair
consideration of future dangerousness evidence is even more applicable
in Virginia than it is in South Carolina.
D. Eighth Amendment Right to Present Mitigation
In Simmons, the defense attorneys also argued that the Eighth
Amendment right to present mitigation evidence required a parole
eligibility instruction. The Court expressly did not decide that issue.
This evidence is also "a basis for a sentence less than death' 156 in the
sense that a defendant will not be dangerous to the population as a whole
if he will bebehind bars. Further, life in prison is a severe punishment and
may be of sufficient severity in a particular case to be a basis for a
sentence less than death. Consequently, this ground for requiring such
evidence of parole eligibility in all capital cases remains open. Once
again, the claim is strengthened when considered in the context of
Virginia's treatment of mitigation evidence.
When the members of the jury, as representatives of society, seek
to fix a punishment, knowledge of the defendant's incarceration is an
affirmative reason to give the defendant a prison sentence because the
members of thejury can decide that this sentence is sufficient to vindicate
the interests of the community. Refusal to provide such evidence is an
impermissible denial of the right to present evidence in mitigation. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that all defendants have the right
to present evidence in mitigation. 157 Once again, the relative importance
of accurate parole information as mitigation is enhanced by the cursory
treatment given mitigation in Virginia.
The courts of Virginia have not taken mitigation seriously in the
past. In Stewart v. Commonwealth,158 the Supreme Court of Virginia
examined whether the bare mention of mitigation in Virginia's verdict
form 159 and the lower court's refusal to instruct the jury on the subject
per the defendant's request violated the defendant's constitutional
to aspects of the defendant's character and record and to circumstances
of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death
penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe
penalty. When the choice is between life and death, that risk is
unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.") and Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1,
8 (1986) ("The exclusion by the state trial court of relevant mitigating
evidence impeded the sentencing jury's ability to carry out its task of
considering all relevant facets of the character and record of the indi-
vidual offender.")
158 245 Va. 222, 427 S.E.2d 394 (1993).
159 "The verdict of the jury shall be in writing, and in one of the
following forms:
(1) 'We, the jury, on the issue joined, having found the
defendant guilty of (here set out statutory language of the
offense charged) and that (after consideration of his prior
history that the there is a probability that he would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
serious threat to society) or his conduct in committing the
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rights.160 The Court found that this was not a violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights and that the jury's ability to vote for life as opposed
to death was not compromised. In Mackall v. Commonwealth,16 1 the
defendant attempted to introduce into evidence that he had previously
informed his parole officer (prior to his incarceration for another crime)
that he wanted to change the prison that he had been sentenced to because
he had friends there that would make it more difficult for him to
rehabilitate himself. The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the decision
of the trial court to withhold this evidence.
The Virginia courts are not the only state courts that have ap-
proached the defendant's right to present mitigation evidence to the jury
so lightly. The South Carolina courts have not been any more liberal in
their recognition of the defendant's constitutional right to present such
evidence.
Prior to Simmons, the South Carolina Supreme Court "rejected the
retroactive application of the stricter parole eligibility provision as
mitigating evidence." 162  Even though a newly enacted statute had
retroactive application and would cause the defendant to be in prison for
a longer amount of time the South Carolina courts would not allow the
defendant to present this evidence as mitigation. In State v. Sims,163 the
South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the trial court's mistaken instruc-
tion that mitigating evidence must reduce the degree of guilt. Even
though the defendant argued forcefully that this precluded the jury's
ability to consider other mitigating factors such as the defendant's
background, the court held that the instruction was not reversible error.
In addition, the principal point of the mitigation argument is that a
prison sentence is a severe and adequate punishment for the defendant's
crime. The defense may use a traditional mitigation argument which
rebuts the state's case in aggravation to show why the defendant behaved
the way he did and that he will no longer be a threat in the structured
confines of the prison setting. The overall point, however, is impossible
to make without informing the jury what that prison sentence will be. If
the jury only has two sentencing alternatives, the knowledge that the
lesser of them is also a formidable punishment is essential to the defense
case.
Given that the United States Supreme Court did not decide the
mitigation issue, it is still open for consideration at a later time. The
offense is outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman
in that it involved (torture)(depravity of mind)(aggravated
battery to the victim), and having considered the evidence in




(2) 'we, the jury, on the issue joined, having found the
defendant guilty (here set out statutory language of the offense
charged) and having considered all of the evidence in aggra-
vation and mitigation of such offense, fix his punishment at
imprisonment for life.
Signed ...... foreman'
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.4(D).
Eighth Amendment argument that the right to present mitigation should
apply to those who are "parole eligible" is strong in Virginia. Indeed, if
Virginia's attempts to comply with constitutional mandates concerning
mitigation can be considered to be sufficient, the state does so barely and
grudgingly.
X. SUMMATION
Although the United States Supreme Court in Simmons dealt
directly with defendants who are ineligible forparole, it did not preclude
requiring states courts to provide parole eligibility information to all
defendants facing the penalty phase of a capital murder trial. The
argument thatVirginia courts should be required to provide this informa-
tion is even more compelling given the importance of future dangerous-
ness in the Virginia death penalty scheme, the lack of relevance and
reliability assigned to the evidence presented to prove future dangerous-
ness in the penalty phases of Virginia capital murder trials, and the
importance of accurate parole information as a mitigating factor.
XI. CONCLUSION
Recent cases summarized in this issue ofthe Capital Defense Digest
demonstrate that the Supreme Court of Virginia is not the court of last
resort for all capital litigationissues. InBreardv.Commonwealth,164the
defense defaulted the potentially lifesaving Simmons issue. By contrast,
in Mickens v. Commonwealth,165 the defense preserved the issue al-
though the Supreme Court of Virginia had previously ruled that parole
eligibility was irrelevant for purposes of sentencing. The perseverance
of these Virginia defense attorneys resulted in a decision by the United
States Supreme Court to remand Mickens in light of Simmons. Thus, the
jury will likely be able to consider parole evidence in Mickens but will
not inBreard, and the difference can only be attributed to the persistence
of Mickens' defense team. Properly presented and litigated, and pre-
served, Simmons may well turn out to be applicable even when parole is
technically available. Present, litigate and preserve until the United
States Supreme Court gives a definitive answer.
160 245 va. at 244-45.427 S.E.2d at 408-09.
161 Mackall v. Commonwealth, (1988).
162 State v. Jones, 378 S.E.2d 594,596 (S.C. 1989).
163 405 S.E.2d 377, 384-85 (S.C. 1991).
164 248 Va. 68,445 S.E.2d 670 (1994).
165 247 Va. 395,442 S.E.2d 678 (1994).

